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Your data or your life. On demonetisation, cash-




1. Demonetisation as shock therapy 
 
Over the past few years, there has been a growing debate over cashless-
ness. In several countries, economists, policy makers and financial institu-
tions have insisted on the advantages of cashlessness, considering digital 
transactions as an instrument of governance pivotal to the achievement of a 
more transparent and inclusive society. Over these same years, cash has be-
come a symbol of tax evasion, corruption, and criminal activities such as 
terrorism, the drug trade and human trafficking. In India, most consumer 
transactions have traditionally been carried out in cash, both in terms of vol-
umes and in terms of value, from when the Indian Government ordered that 
cash be removed from circulation on November 8th, 2016. In contrast to 
countries such as Norway or Sweden, where the cash-to-GDP ratio has been 
slowly declining, banking penetration has always been low in India, with 
merely 53% of households having one bank account, the number of 
ATMs/1000 people being 0.1, financial literacy insufficient even for basic 
operational procedures and the cash-to-GDP ratio of India being among the 
highest in the world, as summarised by the Indian multinational banking 
company ICICI in November 2016. In this context, Indians relied heavily on 
cash for most transactions. Daily workers used to rely on cash to pay for 
daily errands and emergencies, including possible illnesses, but even for 
transactions in real estate (Gettleman, 2018). Women used to fold away their 
cash in their saris and often relied on cash as a hedge against the future. For 
them, demonetisation did not represent a step towards greater financial in-
clusion. More dramatically, it meant the risk that they would not to be able 
to convert their credit into money beyond a certain date. If money is but a 
promise to pay, the Government's refusal to honour the legal tender status of 
Rs 500 and Rs 1000 notes beyond a certain date left citizens with no other 
option but to line up at the nearest bank, hoping they would be able to ex-
change their old bills for new ones.  
In general, the decision to not provide legal backing to 500 and RS 1,000 
notes produced a cash crunch in the country. The problem, however, was not 
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merely the Government's controversial decision to suspend withdrawals or 
the insufficiency of new currency notes but was rather the abruptness with 
which demonetisation was announced. In those days, individuals holding Rs 
500 or Rs 1000 notes could still use them on humanitarian grounds, for in-
stance in government hospitals or in consumer cooperatives. Those who did 
not have a bank account could only deposit these notes in banks or post of-
fices until December 30th. Soon enough, demonetisation generated panic 
among the population. Jeffrey Gettleman reported in the New York Times 
(2018) that some died of heart attacks while waiting in bank lines, while 
stress “pushed several others to suicide” (Gettleman, 2018). Local newspa-
pers reported episodes of children dying in hospitals after they had been de-
nied treatment following a rejection of demonetised banknotes (Bengali, 
2017). According to Kumar and Bumra (2017), the cash shortage forced con-
sumers to cut down on their consumption. In agriculture especially, a labor 
sector that directly or indirectly employs 75% of the population, farmers ex-
perienced a fall in farm income, given their difficulties in selling their prod-
ucts on the street or at the Farmers Market (Sumathy and Savitha, 2017). For 
millions of farmers, it was impossible to get enough cash to buy seeds and 
fertilisers for their winter crops (Sumathy and Savitha, 2017). Looking at the 
impact of demonetisation on the welfare of poor households in the 
Sundarbans region of India, Zhu et al. (2017) concluded that low income 
households had limited tools at their disposal to deal with shocks, such as 
lowering their consumption levels (Zhu et al, 2017). By early January, de-
monetisation had raised concerns that the cash crunch could lead to famine. 
In West Bengal, chief minister Mamata Banerjee alerted the public to the 
fact that farmers were not able to earn money from the growing of vegetables 
and people were cutting consumption (Dinda, 2017). For the most part, the 
Indian population works in the informal economy, consisting of poor people 
with precarious incomes that rely on mutual help to overcome their economic 
difficulties (Patnaik, 2016a). In this context, the shortage of agricultural de-
mand snowballed onto other labor intensive sectors such as textiles, gar-
ments, leather and jewellery, where it affected primarily daily workers who 
either lost their jobs or were temporarily left out of work.  
 
«Agricultural labour, construction workers, employees of micro-enterprises, the 
urban and rural poor – mostly from these marginalised castes – have been pushed to 
the brink of starvation or worse due to loss of jobs and income. The other sections, 
whose lives have been severely disrupted are small and medium-sized farmers, who 
are overwhelmingly from other backward castes and artisans, mostly from poorer 
Muslim communities (…). What the Narendra Modi dispensation is doing through 
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its devious insistence on a digitalised economy – imposing on the already disadvan-
taged a test designed to not just make them fail but also put the blame for their misery 
on their own ‘ignorance’» (Sagar, 2017). 
 
In a study released in 2017 by the Committee to Study the Impact of De-
monetisation on the State Economy of Kerala, a state in which 98% of trans-
actions occurred in cash until 2013, shortages in cash immediately translated 
into a reduction in consumption. In Kerala too, the labor force is largely em-
ployed in the informal sector, often with no written contracts or social secu-
rity. In the Southern State, the cash famine has led to a halt in trade not only 
in agriculture but in the traditional sectors of fisheries, coir, handlooms and 
cashew processing as well as in crop and plantation agriculture, which in turn 
has had an impact on tourism and the service sector (Committee, 2017). In 
the end, the two and a half million migrants that work as wage labourers were 
the hardest hit, together with cash-intensive sectors such as retail trade, ho-
tels and restaurants, and transportation, which account for over 40% of the 
Kerala economy (Committee, 2017).  
 
«Thus 56 per cent of the economic activity of Kerala is immediately affected by 
the withdrawal of specified bank notes. Agriculture, whose growth has been low and 
constrained over the last few years, will be affected directly by the new policy. Any 
turnaround in construction, transport and storage, which have been decelerating in 
the recent past, will be delayed» (Committee, 2017, p.6).  
 
According to Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2018), official estimates of 
GDP do not adequately capture the consequences of demonetisation to the 
expropriation of purchasing power, jobs, livelihoods and employment for a 
considerable part of the population (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2017, p. 
425). “It was like breaking the spine of every Indian and seeing whether you 
can break it”, argued Arundhati Roy in Democracy Now, on May 4th, 2018. 
The consequences did not impact all Indians alike. Even though they had 
been at the forefront of the banking movement, women were the hardest hit. 
In fact, women often relied on cash 
 
«not only to protect themselves against irresponsible, lazy and alcoholic hus-
bands, but more generally to preserve some control over spending-related decisions. 
In a context where the very idea of women’s financial autonomy goes against social 
norms, transparency—what banking and digitalisation of payments offers—is per-
ceived more as a source of dispossession than empowerment» (Guérin at al., 2017, 
p. 7). 
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Caste was also an issue. Even though reports insist on the existence of 
intra-caste mutual help and emphasise that “dense networks of supportive 
relatives, friends and patrons” remained key “for safeguarding daily life and 
the future”, people who could not activate their networks simply struggled. 
Dalit women, in particular, “were not trusted and really struggled to access 
staple food, petrol, etc”. According to Guérin at al., they felt treated like 
“goats” or “dogs” (Guérin at al., 2017, p. 6). In general, Dalit women “spent 
considerable time and energy bargaining, persuading, exchanging, and often 
putting their self-respect aside, in order to assure their households’ survival” 
(Guérin at al., 2017, p. 11). For several months, they struggled to protect 
themselves from demonetisation, mitigating its consequences by cutting con-
sumption or activating their social networks. 
 
 
2. Deceptive narratives 
 
Despite the turmoil, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi presented de-
monetisation as a price worth paying for Indian society. In his initial address 
to the nation on November 8th, 2016, Prime Minister Modi described de-
monetisation as an opportunity to reduce corruption and black money. The 
idea was that since most informal transactions in India are carried out in cash, 
removing cash from circulation would encourage transparency and prevent 
tax evasion and illegal activities. In those weeks, the Finance Minister Arun 
Jaitley also defended the long term results of demonetisation. Notably, he 
insisted that demonetisation would have a negative impact in the short run 
but that everyone would benefit from a «bigger and cleaner GDP» in the long 
run. In an interesting way, the mainstream narrative insisted that disabling 
the “black economy” would enable the government to invest more in public 
spending. In a useful article, entitled “Demonetisation as the Basis for a Fis-
cal Stimulus” (2016a), Patnaik observed that BJP spokespersons promised 
that “black money” would be brought into the country from Swiss Banks and 
distributed among the people, thus benefiting families in distress with the 
«obvious aim … to divert people’s minds from the extraordinary distress 
they are currently facing because of this demonetisation» (Patnaik, 2016a). 
The problem was that such a hypothesis was largely deceptive, as removing 
a certain amount of black money from circulation did not mean that the gov-
ernment could spend more, especially if it was to respect the neoliberal re-
quest to reduce its fiscal deficit (Patnaik, 2016a). Failing to provide any such 
benefits, it may not be entirely surprising that Prime Minister Modi quickly 
changed his narrative. Using a data analysis of the speeches that the Prime 
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Minister delivered across the country between November 13th and Novem-
ber 27th, Praveen Chakravarty (2016a) observed that while the notion of 
“black money” was central in Modi's initial public speeches, together with 
words such as “fake currency” or “counterfeit”, Prime Minister Modi in fact 
changed his narrative in less than two weeks. In a way, Modi's narrative re-
sembled the mainstream narrative around cash, emphasising that cash is a 
rudiment from the past, «redundant, deviant and criminal» (Brett Scott, 
2016), and that the achievement of progress necessarily required a transition 
to digital transactions. Independent scholar Brett Scott has been particularly 
insightful in his analysis of cash narratives, stressing the continuity of argu-
ments dealing with the war on cash in India and abroad. Reflecting the spirit 
of those transnational campaigns that describe cash as the very cause of cor-
ruption, Modi argued that cash symbolises “a 70-year-old disease I have to 
eliminate in 17 months”. “Give me 50 days, then punish me if I am wrong”, 
he argued in his initial address to the nation, promising that this mission was 
going to make «the farmer … happy, the trader... prosperous, every 
woman… empowered and the youth gainfully employed» (quoted in Gandhi, 
2016). 
Despite such narratives, demonetisation attracted national and interna-
tional critics. Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff (2016), a leading advocate 
of digital transactions, openly criticised Modi's initiative as counterproduc-
tive, arguing that an effective removal of cash needed to be introduced over 
the course of several years in order to avoid massive collateral damage. 
Forbes Magazine Editor-in-Chief Steve Forbes maintained that demonetisa-
tion was an act «that is not only damaging its economy and threatening des-
titution to countless millions of its already poor citizens but also breathtaking 
in its immorality» given the economic damage it did to millions of citizens, 
thus further impoverishing the least fortunate among the Indian population 
(Forbes, 2016). Harvard economist Larry Summers, a long time advocate of 
the abolition of $100 notes in the United States, felt that demonetisation was 
inadequate to address illegal or corrupt commercial practices that have been 
prevalent in India for a long time because it led to the expropriation of inno-
cent victims, while most black money is not held in the form of cash but 
rather converted into «foreign exchange, gold, bitcoin or some other store of 
value. So it is petty fortunes, not the hugest and most problematic ones, that 
are being targeted» (Summers and Sarin, 2016). In fact, after demonetisation: 
 
«gold purchases, chit funds, informal loans to others and reciprocal gifts (mostly 
through ceremonial exchanges) continue to be the most popular ways of saving and 
guarding against every-day knocks. Gold has the advantage of combining prestige 
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and liquidity (pawnbrokers are available in every nearby small town) and possibly 
speculation (Goedecke et al 2017; Joseph forthcoming). In our sample, 97% of 
households owned gold, at an average amount that was more than 100 times greater 
than their bank savings» (Guérin at al., 2017, p. 48). 
 
In a way, buying gold was a common reaction to demonetisation. Even in 
that case, however, the most vulnerable citizens were the least protected:  
 
«The amount of gold bought varies by caste (on average, middle castes had al-
most doubled the amount of gold they owned after demonetisation, while Dalits had 
increased the amount by 30%, and upper castes by 7% only). Only women had 
bought gold since demonetisation, confirming the above arguments of a gendered 
response to demonetisation» (Guérin, 2017, p. 49). 
 
 
3. Your data or your life 
 
Within a few weeks, Prime Minister Modi ceased to focus on the benefits 
of the war on cash and to emphasise the importance of digital transactions. 
In fact, a transition towards cashlessness was considered a goal well before 
demonetisation. In October 2016, US development agency USAID and the 
Indian Ministry of Finance established a partnership called Catalyst: Inclu-
sive Cashless Payment Partnership, a multi-stakeholder initiative intended 
to push through the project of a cashless India. As reported in the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) press release: 
 
«Catalyst’s mission is to solve multiple coordination problems that have blocked 
the penetration of digital payments among merchants and low-income consumers. 
We look forward to creating a sustainable and replicable model. (…) While there 
has been (…) a concerted push for digital payments by the government, there is still 
a last-mile gap when it comes to merchant acceptance and coordination issues. We 
want to bring a holistic ecosystem approach to these problems». 
 
Ten months earlier, the UN-based Better Than Cash Alliance had sup-
ported the project, considering digital India a step towards inclusive growth 
and poverty reduction. Presented as a symbol of good governance capable of 
fostering transparency and social inclusion, the transition towards cashless-
ness found open support in on-line companies that promoted digital transac-
tions.  
 
Sociologia del lavoro – Special Issue 2/2019 
 
7 
«Companies that deal in online, cashless transactions, are making the best of this 
move by the government and are on an advertisement blitzkrieg. Apps and websites 
like Paytm, Freecharge, Ola Money and Snapdeal ran full page ads in newspapers 
like the Times of India and The Hindu urging citizens not to worry about the lack of 
cash and go note-free» (TNM, 2016).  
 
In those days, companies that dealt with on-line transactions, e-commerce 
or e-wallet platforms ran full page advertisements in national newspapers. 
The Freecharge company's advertisement on The Times of India stated that 
“cash is not feeling accepted anymore. We are”, while listing a number of 
corporate actors that accepted Freecharge transactions within the country. 
Paytm bought a page in The Times of India to congratulate Modi on demon-
etisation: “Paytm congratulates Honorable Prime Minister Sh. Narendra 
Modi on taking the boldest decision in the financial history of Independent 
India!”. The Ola company added its own commercial stating “Do Note 
Worry: India is going note-free with Ola Money”, while the advertisement 
showed a smartphone inside a pocket suggesting using Ola Money on a smart 
phone app.  
Brilliantly, Brett Scott commented on these advertisements and observed 
that this was not only happening in India. In the same months, 
 
«Visa Europe launched its Cashfree and Proud campaign, to inform cardholders 
that they can make a Visa contactless payment with confidence and feel liberated 
from the need to carry cash. The company's press release declared the campaign 'the 
latest step of Visa UK’s long term strategy to make cash 'peculiar' by 2020.' There 
you have it. An orchestrated strategy to make us feel weird about cash. (…) Visa is 
joined by other propagandists. In 2014 Penny for London arrived, an apparently al-
truistic group set up by the Mayor's Fund for London and Barclaycard, using charity 
as a hook to switch people to contactless cards on the London Underground. PayPal 
plastered cities with billboards claiming that 'new money doesn't need a wallet', 
along with a video proclaiming: 'New money isn't paper, it's progress'. Astro-turfing 
campaigns like No Cash Day are backed by American Express, highlighting such 
anti-cash themes as the environmental impact of banknotes. Other tactics include 
pointing out that criminals use cash, that it fuels the shadow economy, that it's un-
safe, and that it facilitates tax evasion'» (Brett Scott, 2019). 
 
Despite such an unprecedented propaganda machine, the promotion of 
digital transactions was not entirely successful.  
 
«At the time of writing, in late 2017, it appears that this combination of measures 
has met with very limited success; as the currency crunch eased, people reverted to 
cash spending. Figure 2 shows that the number of cashless transactions rose sharply 
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in December 2016, but thereafter has been lower, with little increase since March 
2017.3 Meanwhile, values of digital payments peaked in March 2017, and fell there-
after» (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2017, p. 428). 
 
One year after demonetisation, Finance Minister Arun Jaitely maintained 
that demonetisation  
 
«has brought the issue of digitisation of the economy to the centre-stage and the 
consequence of this has been that in the last one year, the number of digital transac-
tions has almost multiplied by 100%, and new kinds of technologies, applications, 
instruments have been emerging, the banks and government and other finan-
cial/fintech companies have all been innovating and creating new payment gate-
ways, and the mode by which India now spends its money substantially has begun 
to alter» (quoted in Mishra, 2018).  
 
In fact, opinions were not necessarily aligned. In its 2017 annual report, 
for example, Visa admitted having worked closely with the Indian govern-
ment to support demonetisation and having drawn substantial benefits from 
it: «During the year, we have worked closely with the government of India 
to help support its demonetisation efforts. In fiscal year 2017, Visa merchant 
acceptance doubled to 2.5 merchant locations, providing Indian consumers 
with more opportunities to use digital payments rather than cash» (Visa An-
nual Report, 2017, p. 7). Despite conflicting opinions, demonetisation did 
ultimately induce the unbanked and under-banked to open a bank account, 
even though, as Chandrasekhar and Ghosh observe, a quarter of them had 
zero balance, while a similarly significant proportion had negligible balances 
(Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2017, p. 430). It did contribute to increased dig-
ital payments; mobile wallet transactions, payments through credit/debit 
cards or prepaid payment instruments. In short, it did help India’s transition 
from a cash-based economy to the creation of a type of financial inclusion 
led by those IT companies who deliver financial services. However, it did 
not improve the lives of the poor. While in the under-banked countryside the 
cash crunch paralysed transactions and exposed informal sellers, grocers and 
small vendors to economic uncertainty, thus laying the seeds of the economic 
displacement of migrant workers, the miraculous narrative of financial in-
clusion surrounding digital India did not benefit the poor; on the contrary, it 
contributed to exacerbating competition between a sector of young urban, 
educated digital workers and a sector of unskilled rural workers who are 
largely lagging behind.  
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«Urban middle class India, from which most of the economic policy-makers are 
recruited, finds it easy to get credit cards; indeed members of this class are often 
chased by credit-card providers so that they obtain a credit card, but the same is not 
true for the bulk of the country’s population. [...]. As long as there remains a large 
segment of the economy consisting of poor people with uncertain incomes, that is 
not considered “creditworthy” by financial institutions and that has to rely on high 
cost non-institutional sources of credit (in our case this segment covers more than 
half of the working population), all talk of a cashless economy is just empty talk» 
(Patnaik, 2016b, p. 1). 
 
Even though it promised to increase digital transactions, the transition to 
digital payments did not improve salaries or social protections of millions of 
Indians, it did not increase labor formalisation nor did it change their credit-
worthiness or generalised poverty. It only relied on promises of financial re-
wards and on coercive measures to promote cashless transactions and in-
crease the social control of society (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2017, p. 426). 
 
 
4. Aadhaar and the digital panopticon 
 
In point of fact, digital transactions did not improve the economic condi-
tions of poor Indians. On the contrary, they forced the under-banked Indians 
to open bank accounts and linked them in to a system of digital identification 
that was associated with social redistribution schemes (Chauhan, 2017). This 
is the case of Aadhaar, a Unique ID project (UIP) based on biometric identi-
fication which has has been used in India to transit the main food security 
program towards digitality in order to facilitate financial inclusion and pro-
mote distributive justice, as explained in the webpage dedicated to the 
Aadhaar program by the Indian Government. For several months, Aadhaar 
has been considered as both the enabler and the main beneficiary of demon-
etisation. In fact, Aadhaar uses fingerprints and iris scanning to identify cit-
izens and register them as welfare recipients them using a twelve-digit num-
ber. In general, “as the Government pushed for a cashless economy, more 
people came forward to link their bank accounts with Aadhaar, especially 
those benefiting from government schemes,” said a senior UIDAI official 
(Chauhan, 2017). According to The Status of Aadhaar 2016-17, there has 
been a steep increase in Aadhaar enrolments after demonetisation. Since 
then, Aadhaar has contributed to the opening of over 300 million bank ac-
counts in India and citizens have also been required to use Aadhaar as an 
identification system for Indian redistribution schemes. As Silvia Masiero 
argues in her article "The digitalization of anti-poverty programs: Aadhaar 
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and the Reform of Social Protection in India" (Masiero, 2019), the literature 
over the past two decades has largely focused on the role of technology in 
solving problems of effectiveness and accountability. At the same time, tech-
nology is not simply a «carrier of policy», Masiero claims. In so far as tech-
nology is considered as a carrier of anti-poverty policies, under a central gov-
ernment scheme enabling biometric identification, Aadhaar has reformed the 
main social safety schemes and affected its beneficiaries.  
 
«At the micro level, the system leads to monitoring a specific part of the PDS 
supply chain, specifically ration dealers (last-mile retailers), on whom much of the 
corruption in the program is blamed. At the macro level, Indian states can appropri-
ate the same technology, aimed at reshaping the PDS with a cash transfer program, 
to protect the program in its existing form and to implement reforms to minimize 
leakage and corruption. Aadhaar’s infrastructure hence envisages a new policy di-
rection for the poor and marginalised, oriented to direct cash transfers as opposed to 
food subsidies, which states can partially renegotiate according to local visions and 
priorities» (Masiero, 2019, p. 155).  
 
If we look at the role of Aadhaar in India, it is clear that requiring citizens 
to rely on a digital identification system to receive benefits and social pro-
tections is a coercive way to push through a digital agenda. The fact is that 
the requirement to link social redistribution schemes to a system of digital 
identification, translated into a policy of exclusion, rather than inclusion, that 
denied economic assistance to those individuals that were entitled to receive 
it. The problem overarches digital transactions and goes back to the differ-
ence between cash and digital money. In his 2019 article “Gentrification of 
Payments. Spreading the Digital Financial Net”, Brett Scott highlights the 
distinction between cash tokens and digital tokens. Even though we tend to 
think of digital tokens as the electronic version of cash, the notion of cash 
usually refers to the currency in circulation, the total amount of cash and 
notes backed by central banks and government treasuries that is generally 
referred to as M0 in the money supply. Digital money, on the contrary, refers 
to the promises of payment issued by commercial banks and often existing 
in the form of bank deposits that account for 90% to the 99% of the money 
supply, depending on the country. In this context, cash transactions require 
two actors that physically exchange state-backed money. On the contrary, 
digital transactions require a third actor that has the ability to approve or deny 
any monetary activity (Scott, 2019). Brett Scott gives the example of credit 
cards. Anytime we pay by credit card, we ask the credit card company to 
identify us as the holders of our own account and we demand that the credit 
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card company mediate our payment request to the bank and lastly communi-
cate the bank's approval or denial to the seller. In other words, our transac-
tions rely on the arbitrary power of a corporate intermediary. 
 
«The process might entail layers of intermediary institutions – from telecommu-
nications companies to tech firms to credit card networks – but in the end the same 
basic thing is happening: a message ends up at my bank (or at a secondary payment 
service provider using a bank to clear transactions) requesting that they alter my 
account. Even in situations where it appears that banks are not involved, they are. 
Services like PayPal, M-Pesa in Kenya, Paytm in India or WeChat in China are es-
sentially new layers built over the banking digital money system, collaborative ven-
tures with banks, or intermediaries between you and a bank. You can have accounts 
with them, but they in turn will have accounts with banks» (Brett Scott, 2019). 
 
In India, the process was similar. Linking social redistribution schemes 
to a system of digital identification such as Aadhaar implies that anytime the 
working poor need to access their benefits, they ask Aadhaar to identify them 
as the beneficiaries entitled to receive assistance and demand that the system 
mediates their request and lastly that it communicates the state's approval or 
denial of such request to them. It is not surprising that several thousand peo-
ple have been excluded from social programs despite their legal entitlement, 
to the extent of causing death and starvation to individuals who were ex-
cluded by public distribution systems (PDS). According to Sircar (2018),  
 
«In several well-documented instances of exclusion that petitioners have submit-
ted before the court, citizens with Aadhaar have been denied ration because their 
thumb impression could not be read or matched with the fingerprint in UIDAI’s bi-
ometric records». 
 
According to Dey and Roy (2015), over 25 percent of card holders have 
been unable to receive their food rations, which amounts to 250,000 families 
while 10,000 social security pensioners could not receive their pensions (Dey 
and Roy, 2015). For thousands of people, Aadhaar became a system of ex-
clusion that denied subsidies to those who were entitled to receive them. In 
this sense, poverty and the need for economic assistance become opportuni-
ties for digital accumulation. Each customer's data are collected by corporate 
data centres that can exercise strict control over their lives. Drawing on the 
experience of the Social Credit System in China, where corporate data-cen-
tres, in collaboration with the central state, evaluate each person's economic 
conduct and decide whether their transactions should be approved or denied, 
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cashlessness potentially creates a digital panopticon that conditions agency 
to the corporate approval of each person's economic behaviour. 
 
 
5. Hacking Cashlessness 
 
In this context, there are at least three sets of problems. The first problem 
is that the war on cash exposes citizens to financial exclusion, rather than 
inclusion, increasing inequality and exposing individuals to corporate con-
trol and economic despotism. The second is that, in the case of Aadhaar, 
inadequate security practices have revealed the data of up to 135 million 
Aadhaar sensitive numbers, in what has been described as a social calamity. 
The third problem is that demonetisation does not merely entail a transfor-
mation of cash into digital money. Digital money disrupts the cash-based 
economy and its informal, unaccountable relationships to create a digital 
panopticon that condemns humanity to live at the mercy of a network of in-
terest groups that comprise banks, credit card companies and the entire IT 
sector. 
According to Brett Scott: 
 
«There are three commercial interest groups who stand to benefit from such a 
society. The first is the banking sector itself, which controls the underlying bank 
account infrastructure that people will have to use in a cashless society. The second 
is big payments companies like Visa and Mastercard, who facilitate the transfer — 
or, more accurately, editing — of money between those bank accounts. The third is 
the broader financial technology — or fintech — industry that builds services on top 
of this, like phone apps and payments gadgets that are plugged into this infrastruc-
ture» (Scott, 2017, p.149). 
 
Banks, fintech and credit card companies have a direct interest in cash-
lessness, as digital transactions allow them to reduce the number of ATMs, 
cut branches and costs, while credit card companies such as Visa and Mas-
tercard extract rent from every transaction. In this perspective, demonetisa-
tion could be considered as a levy towards digitalisation: a coercive, contro-
versial and contradictory political decision intended to transform digital 
transactions into an instrument for data accumulation and social control. Just 
like Hurricane Katrina relied upon a history of neglect of public infrastruc-
ture in order to “wage war on the very idea of the public sphere and the public 
good”, as Noemi Klein argued (2017), the war on cash undermines trust in 
the cash-based economy to coerce the poor into a digital ecosystem that uses 
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their needs as a levy for corporate accumulation. As argued in the USAID 
report Beyond cash (2016), cash entraps both merchants and consumers in 
its own ecosystem. 
 
«Since few traders accept digital payments, few consumers have an interest in it, 
and since few consumers use digital payments, few traders have an interest in it. 
Given that banks and payment providers charge fees for equipment to use or even 
just try out digital payment, a strong external impulse is needed to achieve a level of 
card penetration that would create mutual interest of both sides in digital payment 
options» (Norbert Häring, 2017). 
 
On the contrary, the ability to shift customers to digital payments benefits 
traders and merchants alike. In this sense, it is not only customers who are 
leading the digital revolution, for reasons of efficiency or simply to reduce 
“the pain of payment”, the process that Duke Professor Dan Ariely describes 
as the agony of partying with our money. In the context of demonetisation, 
customers are coerced into using digital money in order to undermine a social 
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